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PROTECTING SURVIVORS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WITHIN THE
INSURANCE REGIME: OPPORTUNITIES
TO SEEK TERMINATION OR VARIATION
OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey*
Abstract: A person whose life is insured under a life insurance
contract for the benefit of another person does not have a
contractual or common law right to terminate or otherwise
affect the terms of the contract. As well, such contracts remain
valid even after termination of the relationship that provided
an insurable interest at the commencement of the contract. The
existence of a life insurance contract might provide an
incentive for the policy owner/beneficiary to cause harm to the
insured person in order to collect the insurance money.
Recovery of the insurance money is precluded on grounds of
public policy if the beneficiary is found liable for the death of
the insured person. However, this is no comfort for the victim;
indeed, this situation has the potential to create or exacerbate
the vulnerability of victims of domestic violence, who are
mostly women and children. Manitoba, British Columbia and
Alberta have enacted provisions entitling persons whose lives
are insured to seek judicial remedies aimed at alleviating the
safety concerns in specified circumstances, notwithstanding the
applicant’s lack of privity of contract. This paper examines the
bases and nature of the remedial options and explores how
they can effectively protect persons whose lives are insured for
the benefit of the policy owner and the appropriate threshold
for granting remedies. Applicants may seek remedies under the
insurance legislation in conjunction with protection orders in
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the family or criminal context. Courts are likely to assess
similar factors when considering appropriate remedies under
the insurance and family law regimes. Although these remedies
are not a panacea for domestic violence, they may be
significant in preventing violence against women and children
whose lives are insured by other family members and where the
latter’s motivation for violence may include recovery of
insurance money.
INTRODUCTION
The insurer-insured relationship is inherently an unequal one.
Consequently, an important goal of insurance regulation is to
protect consumers of insurance products. However, the
vulnerability that may arise in an insurance context is not
limited to the insurer-insured relationship. Perpetrators of
domestic violence can use the existence of an insurance policy
as a “weapon” to terrorize their victims, who are most
commonly women and children.1 A policy owner who is also
the beneficiary under an insurance policy can hold a valid
insurance contract on the life of another person with whom
they may have a strained relationship. This is concerning in
circumstances where there is potential for violence by the
policy owner/beneficiary against the person whose life is
1

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
The prevalence of domestic violence against women was highlighted
in a 2013 World Health Organization report. According to the report,
over 30 percent of women experience violence at the hands of an
intimate partner, making it the most common type of abuse affecting
women. As well, the report notes that 38 percent of all murdered
women died at the hands of their partners. While there are regional
variations in the prevalence of violence against women, the rate of
abuse in high-income countries including Canada is 23.2 percent.
WHO, Global and Regional Estimates of Violence against Women:
Prevalence and Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence and nonPartner
Sexual
Violence
(Geneva,
2013),
online:
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85239/1/9789241564625_e
ng.pdf>.
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insured. The nature of life insurance contracts whereby the
person whose life is insured is different from the beneficiary
can create a temptation for the latter to cause the insured risk,
that is, end the former’s life; this creates “a decidedly harmful
tendency”.2 Concerns about the harmful tendency created by
the opportunity to benefit from the death of the person whose
life is insured are mitigated by the fact that there is often a
relationship of love and affection between the
owner/beneficiary and the life insured. The former is interested
in the continuing existence of the latter. The force of that
assumption may wane where there is a breakdown of the
relationship of love and care and the beneficiary may no longer
be interested in the continuing existence of the person whose
life is insured and upon whose death they have an opportunity
for financial gain.
A person whose life is insured under a valid insurance
contract for the benefit of another has no common law or
contractual right to apply to the insurer for termination or
variation of the terms of the insurance contract on her or his
life. This position stems from the well-worn doctrine of privity
of contract, whereby a third party to a contract is precluded
from affecting the contract’s terms. The concern that the privity
doctrine may be ill-suited to life insurance contracts was raised
in the debate in the BC legislature leading to the enactment of
the 2012 Insurance Act:
Currently a life-insured individual who is not the
policyholder cannot cancel the life insurance
policy even though the policy owner may no
longer have an insurable interest in that person's
life. This situation may arise, for example, upon
termination of employment or upon a divorce.
The person whose life is insured may feel
2

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Edwin W Patterson, “Insurable Interest in Life” (1918) Columbia L
Rev, 381 at 389.
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uncomfortable or even at personal risk knowing
that their death will benefit another individual.3
Insurance legislation is beginning to address this
concern. Recent amendments or enactments of insurance
legislation in some Canadian jurisdictions aim to protect
survivors of domestic violence and, more generally, insured
persons upon the breakdown of relationships, and seek to
neutralize the potential of an insurance policy to contribute to
the systemic violence against women and children. Two
specific legislative reforms stand out in this regard: (1)
recovery by an innocent co-insured where an insured under the
same policy intentionally causes loss or damage to the insured
property;4 and (2) option for seeking a court order for
termination or variation of the terms of an insurance contract
where the person whose life is insured feels he or she could be
at risk of harm at the hands of the owner/beneficiary of the

3

4

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
British Columbia, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative
Assembly (Hansard), 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 4, No 2 (6 October
2009) at 987 (B. Ralston).
Insurance Act, RSBC 2012, c 1, s 35 [BC Insurance Act]; see also
Insurance Act, RSA 2000, c I-3, s 541 [Alberta Insurance Act];
Insurance Act, CCSM I40, s 136.5 [Manitoba Insurance Act]. This
provision protects the interests of persons with joint ownership or
interests in the same property, such as the family home, and their
interests are insured under a single insurance policy with joint rights
and obligations for co-insureds. Prior to the introduction of the
provision protecting the interests of the innocent co-insured, such
persons were vulnerable to the actions of their partners and
cohabitants who cause damage or loss to the insured property because
they were also precluded from recovering their interest in the insured
property under the intentional/criminal injury exclusion clause in
insurance contracts. For a discussion of this provision, see E. AdjinTettey, “Personal Responsibility for Intentional Conduct: Protecting
the Interests of Innocent Co-Insured under Insurance Contracts”
(2013) 50 Alta L Rev 615.

Protecting Survivors of Domestic Violence Within the
Insurance Regime

215

insurance policy on her or his life,5 or where insurable interest
ceases to exist.6 This paper will focus on the latter issue and
examine the extent to which the termination and/or variation
provisions offer protection to victims of domestic violence.
The paper begins with a discussion of the rationale for
termination or variation remedies in life, accident and sickness
insurance contracts. This is followed by a discussion of the
insurable interest requirement for non-indemnity insurance
contracts, highlighting concerns about requiring an insurable
interest only at the commencement of a contract but not at the
time of loss. Next, the paper explains the need to protect
persons whose lives are insured by others, especially in the
domestic context where there may be the potential for violence.
In such cases, the possibility of financial gain from collecting
insurance money may reasonably be perceived as a motive for
the policy owner/beneficiary to endanger the life or health of
the person whose life is insured in order to bring about the
insured loss. So far, Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia
have enacted provisions entitling persons whose lives are
insured to seek judicial remedies in specified circumstances.
Similar amendments have been introduced in Ontario but the
provisions are yet to come into force. I examine the bases for
and the available remedies, and suggest ways in which the
provisions could offer better protections for persons whose
lives are insured including the appropriate threshold for
granting remedies.
Terminating or Varying Insurance Contracts
Currently in BC, Alberta and Manitoba, a person whose life is
insured under a life or accident and sickness insurance policy,
and who reasonably believes continuation of the insurance
5

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
BC Insurance Act, ibid, ss 47 and 109; Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, ss
648 and 717, Manitoba Insurance)Act,)ibid,!ss!155.1!and!217.2.
6!Manitoba

Insurance)Act,)ibid,)ss!155(4)!and!217.1.!
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contract might endanger her or his life or health, can seek a
court order to allay the concern about their health and wellbeing.7 The court has the discretion to provide a remedy that it
sees fit in the circumstances, which may include termination of
the contract in accordance with its terms or variation of the
terms of the contract such as reducing the insurance amount.
This remedy is intended to eliminate, or at least reduce, the risk
to the insured person’s life or health emanating from the policy
owner/beneficiary holding an insurance contract on their life.
The need for such a remedy typically arises in the domestic
context where a family member might be concerned that the
beneficiary of the policy, who is also likely to be the policy
owner, could harm them to collect insurance money or could
engineer the insured event for a variety of reasons including
jealousy, acrimonious relationship breakdown, or as an act of
violence.8
A beneficiary is precluded from recovering the
insurance money where he or she is found to be responsible for
bringing about the insured loss, specifically for causing the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

7

BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 47 (life) and s 109 (accident and
sickness). See also Alberta Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 648 (life), s
717 (accident and sickness); Manitoba Insurance)Act,)supra)note!4,!s!
155.1!(life)!and!s!217.2!(accident and sickness);)Insurance Act, RSO
1990, c I.8, ss 179.1 (life), 306.1 (accident and sickness) (not yet in
force)[Ontario Insurance Act]. In Manitoba, there is also an option of
seeking termination of an insurance contract upon cessation of
insurable interest: Manitoba Insurance Act,, ss 155(4) and 217.1.

8

Although the uneasiness about a person continuing to be the owner
and beneficiary of an insurance policy after the termination of a
relationship often arises in the domestic context, it can also arise in
any of the other relationships that give rise to an insurable interest
such as breakdown in an employment relationship as was in
Chantiam v Packall Packaging Inc (1998), 38 OR (3d) 401, 159 DLR
(4th) 517 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1998] SCCA 358
[Chantiam]; and in partnerships as was in Hechter v Sonya (1999),
131 Man R (2d) 295 (CA) [Hechter].
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death of the person whose life is insured.9 However, this would
be little comfort if the person whose life was insured had been
killed. Although it may be difficult to draw a firm link between
spousal murder and life insurance benefits, there are a
multitude of cases in which such benefits have been cited as a
possible factor in homicides.10 As well, there may not always
be sufficient evidence to charge and prosecute the beneficiary,
or to find him or her liable for causing the insured event on the
criminal standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally, the insurer may not have sufficient evidence to
deny recovery of the insurance money based on the civil
standard of balance of probabilities in a claim on the policy. In
such cases, the beneficiary may still be able to benefit from the
insurance contract even if a cloud of suspicion continues to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

9

See Brissette Estate v Westbury Life Ins Co, [1992] 3 SCR 87;
Papasotiriou-Lanteigne v Manufacturer's Life Insurance Co, 2012
ONSC 6473 at para 14; Oldfield v Transamerica Life Insurance Co of
Canada, 2002 SCC 22; Goulet v Transamerica Life Insurance Co of
Canada, 2002 SCC 21; Demeter v Dominion Life Assurance
Company (1982), 35 OR (2d) 560 (CA); Chan Estate (Public Trustee
of) v Allstate Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 1998 ABQB 1031, 238
AR 63 (QB). See also Erik Knutsen, “Fortuity Clauses in Liability
Insurance: Solving Coverage Dilemma for Intentional and Criminal
Conduct” (2011-12) 37 Queen’s LJ 73.

10

For several illustrative examples of cases in which life insurance was
thought to play a role in spousal homicide, see R v Toor, 2005 BCCA
333 (husband took out life insurance on his new wife and murdered
her with the help of his son); R v Kelley (1999), 135 CCC (3d) 449
(ON CA), application for leave to appeal denied [2001] SCJ No 26
(one of the motives for spousal murder thought to be collection of life
insurance policy); R v Figueroa, 2008 ONCA 106 (appeal of
conviction for the murder of accomplice’s wife where the
accomplice/husband was suspected of arranging the murder in order
to use deceased’s life insurance to pay off debts); R v Samuels, [2005]
OJ No 1873 (CA), leave to appeal refused [2005] SCCA No 313
(motive for murder of wife thought to be collection of life insurance
policy, new trial ordered as a result of misleading jury instructions).
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hang over them. It is therefore important to give persons whose
lives are insured the means to pre-empt concerns about the
insured/beneficiary causing the insured loss, by removing the
financial incentive for doing so.
Insurable Interest and Non-Indemnity Insurance Contracts
A court order is required to terminate or vary the terms of a
non-indemnity insurance contract because of how the concept
of insurable interest operates in relation to such contracts. Life,
accident and sickness insurance are non-indemnity contracts.
Unlike indemnity insurance contracts (for example, property
insurance), recovery under non-indemnity insurance contracts
is not dependent on proof of financial loss on the happening of
the insured loss (for instance, the death of the person insured).
Absence of the requirement for proof of financial loss gives
rise to the possibility of personal insurance contracts being
used as wagers, with a corresponding risk of moral hazard that
a beneficiary may be interested in bringing about the insured
loss, in this case, cause the death of the person whose life is
insured for financial gain. To avoid this possibility, and to
distinguish insurance contracts from wagers, the insured or
policy owner is required to have an insurable interest in the
person whose life is insured. Insurable interest ensures that the
insured has a connection with the person whose life is insured
such that they are interested in the latter’s continued existence
and will suffer a detriment should harm befall that person, even
if that loss cannot be estimated in monetary terms. The
requirement of insurable interest is therefore intended to
minimize the potential for moral hazard given the
corresponding detriment to the insured should the insured loss
materialize.11 A person has an insurable interest in their own
11

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
For a discussion of the evolution and critique of the insurable interest
requirement, see Jacob Loshin, “Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody:
A Case against the Insurable Interest Requirement” (2007) 117 Yale
LJ 474.
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life and in the lives of designated persons based on blood,
affinity or pecuniary interests; these can include immediate
family members (such as a child, grandchild, or spouse),
employees, and others who consent to the purchaser of the
policy insuring their lives.12 Such contracts do not provide that
the insurer indemnify the insured for a pecuniary loss on the
happening of an insured event. Rather, it is for the insurer to
provide a predetermined amount when the insured risk
materializes, for example death of the person whose life is
insured.13
Non-indemnity insurance contracts only require the
existence of insurable interest at the inception of the contract.
Subsequent loss of insurable interest during the lifetime of the
person whose life is insured does not affect the validity of the
insurance contract.14 As well, an insurable interest is not
required at the time of loss. Thus, it is possible that a person
could claim insurance money for the death of another person
with whom they had never had a relationship: for example,
where the former is an assignee of the benefits of the insurance

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

12

See BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, ss 45(2)(b), 46 (life) and ss
107(2)(b), 108 (accident & sickness); Alberta Insurance Act, supra
note 4, ss 646(2)(b), 647 (life) and ss 715(2)(b), 716 (accident &
sickness); Manitoba Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 148(2) (life) and s
203(2) (accident & sickness); Ontario Insurance Act, supra note 7, ss
178(2)(b), 179 (life) and ss 305, 306(2)(b) (accident & sickness);
Insurance Act, RSNS 1989, c 231, ss 79, 80(2)(b) (accident &
sickness) and ss 180(2)(b), 181 (life).

13

See Glynn v Scottish Union and National Insurance Co. Ltd., [1963]
2 OR 705 (CA).

14

See Kosmopoulos v Constitution Insurance Company of Canada,
[1987] 1 SCR 2; Chantiam, supra note 8. See also David Norwood
and John P Weir, Norwood on Life Insurance Law in Canada, 3d ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 85 [Norwood].
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contract.15 A beneficiary can also make a claim upon the death
of a person with whom they had ceased to have a relationship
that supported an insurable interest and to whom they might in
fact have been an adversary, competitor, etc. In Chantiam v
Packall Packaging Inc., the Ontario Court of Appeal did not
consider the latter situation to be contrary to public policy,
reasoning that if it were, the legislature would have taken steps
to address the situation. The Court noted:
So long as the owner had an insurable interest at
the commencement of the contract, the contract
cannot subsequently be treated as though it were
a wagering contract. While one can readily
understand that the continuance of the insurance
after the relationship giving rise to the insurable
interest has ended may, as it is in this case, be
offensive to the insured life, this is not a basis
for nullifying or revoking an existing policy or
for rendering it voidable at the request of the
insured life. It must be assumed that the
legislature has taken the public interest into
account in not enacting provisions requiring that
the termination of the insurable interest operates
to cancel the contract… In the absence of
15

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
There are valid reasons for not requiring existence of insurable
interest at the time of loss, including making it possible for the
beneficiary to assign the benefits of life insurance contracts for
security and other purposes. This is justified on the bases that such
contracts are non-indemnity and also are investments and a form of
property that can be traded like all other aspects of a person’s
investment or savings portfolio. In fact, insurance legislation
specifically gives beneficiaries of a life insurance policy the ability to
assign their interest in the insurance money; see BC Insurance Act,
supra note 4, s 66(1); Alberta Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 667(1);
Ontario Insurance Act, supra note 7, s 200(3); Sun Life Assurance Co
(Steadman) v Admin and Trust Co, [1933] 2 WWR 348 (Man KB);
see also Norwood, ibid, at 359-360.
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legislation to this effect, the general principle
that the subsequent termination of an insurable
interest does not affect the rights of an ownerbeneficiary must prevail.16
It is not uncommon for a person whose life is
insured to feel uncomfortable about the continuation of
the insurance policy when the relationship that
supported the insurable interest at the outset of the
contract ceases to exist, especially when there is
hostility between the owner/beneficiary and the person
whose life is insured.17 In such cases, the concern is
that the owner/beneficiary may in fact be interested in
the happening of the insured event so they may “cash
in” on the insurance policy. This situation heightens
concerns about moral hazards that could endanger the
life and health of the person whose life is insured along
with third parties. However, there are also situations in
which continuation of a policy even upon relationship
breakdown is an admitted advantage. For example, in
the family law context, a life insurance policy may be a
source of financial security for a spouse or child after
the dissolution of a marital relationship. Courts have
discretion to make orders for the continuation of life
16

17

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Chantiam, supra note 8 at para 18. The amendment to the Ontario
Insurance Act, s 179.1, that is yet come into force does not make life
insurance contracts voidable upon the cessation of insurable interest.
However, it will provide an opportunity for the person whose life is
insured to seek an appropriate remedy when s/he reasonably believes
her or his life or health is endangered by the existence of an insurance
contract on her or his life. Such a provision would have given the
plaintiff in Chantiam the remedy that he sought after termination of
the employment relationship and the plaintiff became a business
competitor; termination or transfer of the policy to him at fair market
value as the Court saw fit in the circumstances.
See Hechter, supra note 8; Chantiam, ibid; Ralston, supra note 3.

222

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 29,
2014]

!
insurance policies as a means to ensure that child or
spousal support continue after the death of a payor
spouse/parent.18
Termination of Insurance Policy: The Original Manitoba
Provision
In 1986, Manitoba became the first Canadian jurisdiction to
amend its insurance legislation to give a person whose life is
insured the opportunity to seek termination of an insurance
contract on their life following termination of the relationship
that gave rise to insurable interest that supported the insurance
contract. When insurable interest no longer exists, an
individual may obtain a court order to terminate the policy on
her or his life. The provision states:
A person whose life is insured may, where
insurable interest no longer exists, apply to the
court for an order requiring the insurer to
immediately terminate the policy and pay over
to the policy owner any value that exists in the
policy.19
The provision was prompted by recognition of the fact
that some insureds might feel uneasy if another person with
whom they no longer had a relationship held an insurance
contract on their life. "In some circumstances, such as marriage
breakdown or dissolution of a partnership, a person whose life
is insured may become uncomfortable or find it offensive that
an ex-spouse or an ex-partner continues to pay insurance
premiums and to stand to personally gain by that individual's
18
19

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
BC Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 170(e).
Manitoba Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 155(4). Manitoba enacted a
similar provision in relation to accident and sickness insurance in
2012: Manitoba Insurance Act, ibid, s 217.1.
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death”.20 The provision was intended to remedy a fundamental
problem with how the insurable interest requirement operates
in relation to life insurance policies. Manitoba addressed this
problem decisively; the power to terminate a life insurance
policy is absolute if the person seeking termination can prove
their life is insured under a policy and that the requisite
insurable interest that supported the policy no longer exists.
The applicant does not need to advance any other reason for
seeking termination of the policy, and Manitoba courts do not
have the discretion to decide whether termination in the
circumstances is appropriate or not. For example, the court
cannot probe a person whose life is insured to advance
additional reasons such as stress or actual or potential danger to
their life or well-being as further conditions for seeking
termination. As the Manitoba Court of Appeal stated in
Hechter v Sonya:
Where an insurable interest ceases to exist, the
person whose life is insured may apply to the
court for an order terminating the policy. He/she
must establish that his/her life is insured and an
insurable interest no longer exists. The provision
requires no other conditions to be established for
the making of an order terminating the policy. It
would be wrong for the court, by the exercise of
judicial discretion, to add conditions to the
application of s. 155(4) of the Act that the
Legislature has not imposed. In our view, that
would amount to unwarranted judicial
legislation.21
20

21

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates
(Hansard), 33rd Leg, 1st Sess, Vol 61 (6 August 1986) at 2654
(Alvin Mackling).
Hechther, supra note 8 at para 9. In Hechther, the parties entered into
a partnership as practicing orthodontists and agreed that they would
each insure the life of the other. When the partnership ended with the
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The provision is not completely inflexible, however. It
recognizes that persons who are no longer in a relationship that
provided an insurable interest may wish to continue existing
policies to ensure mutual benefit and financial security in the
event of accident, disability, sickness or death. In fact, it is not
uncommon for the continuation of insurance to be one of the
terms in separation or divorce agreements.22 There is therefore
no assumption of a threat to the person whose life is insured
upon cessation of an insurable interest to justify automatic
termination of the insurance policy. This is why the provision
gives the person whose life is insured the option of seeking
termination of the policy upon cessation of insurable interest if
he or she feels that is necessary in the circumstances, although
there is no requirement to provide reasons for seeking
termination beyond proof of loss of insurable interest. Once
such an application is made, the court is mandated to grant, and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
plaintiff’s retirement and in light of the acrimonious way in which
that relationship ended, the plaintiff sought to sever all ties with the
defendant including terminating the life insurance policy. The
plaintiff terminated the policy on the defendant’s life but the latter
refused to do the same. The defendant also declined the plaintiff’s
subsequent request to assign the policy to him or terminate it,
whereupon the plaintiff sought a remedy under s 155(4). The
Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld termination of the policy, rejecting
the defendant’s arguments that the motions judge erred in finding that
the remedy of termination is mandatory and that the plaintiff had
failed to establish valid reasons to justify the court making an order to
terminate the policy.
22

See Bond v Bond, 2012 ONSC 4374; Turner v DiDonato (2009), 95
OR (3d) 147 (Ont CA); Dufresne v Dufresne, 2009 ONCA 682;
Haber v Nicolle, 2011 BCSC 210; Stewart v Stewart Estate, 2011
BCSC 774; Job v Job, 2009 BCSC 1806. These cases all involve
situations wherein the continuation of life insurance, with the exspouse or children as the named beneficiary/beneficiaries is included
as an explicit term in the separation/divorce agreement. See also
Keith B Farquhar, “Designated Insurance and Pension Beneficiaries
and Unfulfilled Expectations” (1997) 14 Can J Fam L 63.
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only to grant, a termination order. No other remedy, such as
variation of the terms, is possible under s 155(4) (and now s
217.1) of the Manitoba legislation. While important in
providing comfort to persons no longer in a relationship with
the policy owner/beneficiary, these provisions do not provide a
remedy so long as the relationship that provided insurable
interest for the contract continues. Like Alberta and BC,
Manitoba has now enacted provisions entitling persons whose
lives and well being are insured to seek a judicial remedy for
termination or variation even if the relationship giving rise to
insurable interest continues to exist. Amendment to the Ontario
Insurance Act introducing similar provisions is yet to come into
force.
Seeking a Judicial Remedy for Termination or Variation of
Insurance Contracts
Currently, persons whose lives are insured by others in British
Columbia, Alberta and Manitoba may obtain a remedy where
they reasonably believe that continued existence of the policy
endangers their life or health. 23 Courts have discretion to grant
the remedy that they see fit in the circumstances, and may
include an order for the termination of the policy in accordance
with the terms of the insurance contract or for a reduction in
the insurance amount. While the provisions recognize the
importance of protecting insured persons who fear for their
lives or well-being, they also ensure due process for the
insured, insurer and others with an interest in the insurance
contract. The provisions strike a fair balance between the
interests of the person whose life is insured and other
23

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 47 (life), s 109 (accident and
sickness); Alberta Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 648 (life), s 717
(accident and sickness); Manitoba Insurance) Act,) supra) note! 4,! s!
155.1!(life)!and!s!217.2!(accident and sickness);)Ontario!Insurance
Act, supra note 7, ss 179.1 (life), 306.1 (accident and sickness) (not
yet in force).
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stakeholders by ensuring that they are aware that the person
whose life is insured is seeking a remedy under those
provisions. Generally, the insured, insurer and others with an
interest in the insurance contract such as assignees must be
given notice of the application.24 The legislation also
recognizes that in some cases notifying some stakeholders,
especially the insured/beneficiary, of the application for a
remedy may actually endanger the health or life of the person
whose life is insured. Courts have the discretion to waive the
notice requirement to a person other than the insurer or insured
for contracts of group insurance or creditor’s group insurance if
it deems it just in the circumstances. For example, the person
whose life is insured may convince the court that the danger is
imminent and the notice period could be detrimental to their
life or health as the beneficiary could act within that period or a
notice might trigger the beneficiary to take the dreaded
action.25 An order made under these provisions is binding on
anyone with interest in the insurance contract.26 The discretion
to waive the notice requirement is particularly useful where the
need for a remedy stems from actual or potential acts of
domestic violence because it allows the abuser/beneficiary to
be blind-sided.

24

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 47(3), s 109(3); Alberta Insurance Act, ibid,
s 648(3), s 717(3); Manitoba Insurance) Act,) ibid,! ss! 155.1(3)! and!
217.2(3).

25

BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 47(4), s 109(4); Alberta Insurance Act, ibid,
s 648(4), s 717(4); Manitoba Insurance) Act,) ibid,! s! 155.1(4),! s!
217.2(4). The reference to insured in the context of group insurance
is not to the individual insured/beneficiary but rather the owner or
sponsor of the policy such as the beneficiary’s employer, trade union
or professional association.

26

BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 47(5), s 109(5); Alberta Insurance Act, ibid,
s 648(5), s 717(5); Manitoba Insurance) Act,) ibid,! s! 155.1! (5),! s!
217.2(5).
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Cessation of insurable interest between the insured and
the person whose life is insured is not a precondition for
granting a remedy under these provisions.27 Thus, a person
whose life is insured can obtain an order for termination of the
insurance contract or variation of the insurance amount even
when the relationship that supported insurable interest
continues to exist. This allows for the protection of, for
example, abused partners, estranged spouses, or children who
may still be considered to be legally in a relationship with the
owner/beneficiary that supported an insurable interest.
Effectiveness of the Termination or Variation Provisions to
Protect Persons Insured by Others
The provisions giving courts discretion to terminate or vary
terms of an insurance contract provide a broader basis for
protecting persons whose lives and well being are insured
compared to the termination only remedy upon cessation of
insurable interest provisions; applicability of the former is not
limited to situations where insurable interest ceases to exist.
There may be good reason for a person, usually a woman,
whose life is insured to seek termination or variation of the
insurance policy, even before the termination of a relationship
or loss of insurable interest, or variation such as reduction in
the insurance amount after a relationship breakdown. The
termination-only remedy upon cessation of insurable interest
seems to be focused on situations of dissolution of partnerships
or business relationships, breakdown of spousal relationships,
or withdrawal of consent to insure a person outside the
designated relationships giving rise to insurable interest. Yet,
insurable interest exists in a broader range of relationships,
often based on blood and kinship ties that are not severable, for
example a parent-child relationship. As well, cessation of
insurable interest may not be readily ascertainable in some
27
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BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 47, s 109; Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, s
648, s 717; Manitoba Insurance)Act,)ibid,!s!155.1,!s!217.2.
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situations such as where the owner/beneficiary is dependent on
the person whose life is insured for support or otherwise has a
pecuniary interest in the duration of their life.28 The broader
provisions giving courts the discretion to grant appropriate
remedies recognize that while the concern about moral hazard
may arise in the business or spousal context, it can also arise in
the other relationships giving rise to insurable interest. Thus, it
is unduly restrictive to limit the option of seeking a remedy to
situations of loss of insurable interest and for the only option to
be termination of the insurance contract.
As well, a termination-only option for judicial
intervention appears to impose too great a constraint on courts
and does not adequately recognize the range of concerns that
persons whose lives are insured may have. Depending on the
situation, a reduction in the insurance amount may be all that is
required to protect the insured person or at least give them a
sense of security. There may also be legitimate reasons to have
the policy continue after cessation of insurable interest as
insurance money can be included in the division of assets or
used to support children and spouses after relationship
breakdown. The broader termination or variation provisions
recognize the variability of situations that may necessitate
seeking a judicial remedy and the reality that termination of the
insurance contract may not be warranted in every situation.
That is why courts have the discretion to fashion a remedy that
they consider to be just in the circumstances.
This is not to say that the provisions giving courts
discretion to grant an appropriate remedy without reference to
cessation of insurable interest are without shortcomings. Like
the termination-only remedy, the discretionary provisions raise
some real concerns and questions about achieving the intended
remedial purpose. An obvious difficulty is that persons whose
28
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See definition of insurable interest: BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, s
46; Manitoba Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 156.
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lives are insured by others must be aware of the existence of
the policy and must also know of the option of seeking a
judicial remedy. An insured may insure the life of a person in
whom they have an insurable interest, usually a family
member, or to increase the insurance amount without that
person’s knowledge or consent.29 It is therefore possible that
persons whose lives are insured may not be aware of the
insurance contract on their lives or of an increase in the
insurance amount in circumstances that could pose a threat to
their life or health. Without that knowledge, a person whose
life is insured may not be aware of the danger to her or him or
the need to seek an order to eliminate or at least reduce the
threat to her or his life. The potential for lack of knowledge is
particularly great in the domestic context—the very context the
provisions attempt to address—because family relationships
give rise to insurable interests and the consent or knowledge of
a family member is not required to obtain an insurance policy
on her or his life. Therefore, it may well be that the provisions
only benefit those who are aware of the insurance policy on
their lives and have the opportunity to apply to court for a
29
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Consent of the person whose life is to be insured is required only for
those who do not fall within the relationships giving rise to an
insurable interest. See BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, ss 45, 46, 107
and 108. A person whose life is insured may be aware of the contract
to be obtained or increase in the insurance amount where they are
asked to answer questions about their health status or disclose
relevant factors affecting insurability not disclosed by the insured
pursuant to the disclosure obligation that is imposed on both the
insured and the person whose life is insured. BC Insurance Act, ibid,
s 51(1); s 111(1). However, the need for such disclosure and hence
awareness of the policy may not be necessary where the insured can
confidently answer all the relevant questions or make the necessary
disclosure regarding the person whose life is insured. As well,
individualized assessment of insurability may not be required under
some group plans. Thus, there is no guarantee the person whose life is
insured will get to know of the existence of the policy and/or increase
in the insurance amount.
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remedy when they reasonably believe their life or health may
be endangered by it or upon cessation of insurable interest.
These termination and variation provisions are more
likely to be effective if the legislation also mandated that
persons whose lives are insured must be made aware of the
existence of such an insurance policy on their lives and/or
increase in the insurance amount within a reasonable time after
the policy is taken or any increase, for instance within 30 days,
and given the option to seek a remedy as outlined in the
insurance legislation. Such a requirement would be similar to
the obligation on the part of insurers to notify a loss payee
before cancelling an insurance contract,30 and to inform an
insured about the existence of provisions in the contract that
limit their rights of recovery, such as deductibles or coinsurance clauses.31 In the meantime, to make the termination
or variation provisions more effective, it should be a matter of
best practice for insurers to notify persons whose lives are
insured of the existence of such a contract and or increases in
the insurance amount. It is also important for individuals who
work with survivors of domestic violence to inquire about the
existence of life insurance policies and to advise their clients to
seek the appropriate remedy.32

30
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BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 28; Alberta Insurance Act, supra
note 4, s 539; Manitoba Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 136.3.
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BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 31; Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, s 543;
Manitoba Insurance Act, ibid, s 136.6.
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This may not be an effective approach if the person whose life is
insured is unaware of the existence of the policy. However, if they
know an estranged partner has such a policy on their life, the inquiry
may prompt them to also see the financial incentive as a possible
reason to be concerned about their safety and seek an appropriate
remedy.
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Cessation of insurable interest per se does not entitle a
person whose life is insured to seek a remedy under the
termination or variation provisions. It is only when they
reasonably believe that their life or health may be endangered
by the continuation of the insurance contract that they can seek
a remedy. Thus, as previously mentioned, while the provisions
recognize that the threat to a person’s life or health may arise
even in the course of an ongoing relationship, it does not
assume that a person’s health or life is endangered upon
cessation of insurable interest. However, the provision does not
indicate the necessary evidence and/or threshold for an
applicant to prove reasonable belief that her or his life is in
danger to warrant termination or variation of a policy. This
might allow courts to exercise greater discretion in determining
when and what remedy is warranted in particular
circumstances. However, until there is established case law
from higher courts giving guidance for assessing such
applications, there may be concern about what trial courts
would consider appropriate evidence to justify making an
order.
There may also be a concern that individuals who feel
their health or life may be endangered by the continuation of an
insurance contract may not be able to provide the requisite
proof and could be denied a remedy. Given the potential for
volatility in the domestic context, it may be relatively easy for
ex-partners or spouses or those in the process of separating and
seeking divorce to establish threat to their life or health as a
reason for seeking a court order for termination or variation of
the terms of an insurance contract on their life. In fact, such an
order may be sought as part of separation or divorce
proceedings or even pending the termination of the
relationship, or where a party obtains a protection order as an
at-risk family member or a victim of family violence in the
family law context. However, the need for a remedy may be
less clear where the person whose life is insured continues to
have contact or some relationship with the insured, which is not
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uncommon in the spousal context. For instance, a woman may
not easily leave an abusive relationship because of financial
dependence on her partner or threats of violence if she dares to
leave. As well, ex-partners may continue to have contact with
each other because of shared parenting responsibilities. Thus, a
more nuanced consideration of the applicant’s situation is
required in such cases to determine the appropriate remedy in
the circumstances.33

!
Establishing the Basis for a Remedy: Lessons from the
Family Law Context
There are similarities in the remedial purposes of the
termination or variation provisions under the Insurance Act and
protection orders in the family law context;34 in particular, both
regimes seek to protect vulnerable family members.
Comparisons can also be drawn with a recognizance or “peace
bond” under s. 810 of the Criminal Code.35 It is therefore
33
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There may be a number of reasons – social, economic, cultural – why
a person who feels her or his life or health may be endangered by the
continuation of a life insurance policy on her or his life may not
terminate a relationship with the policy owner/beneficiary, or at least
not at that time.

34

Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 183; Protection Against Family
Violence Act, RSA 2000, c P-27, s 4.

35

According to the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 810(1), an
information for a recognizance “may be laid before a justice by or on
behalf of any person who fears on reasonable grounds that another
person will cause personal injury to him or her or to his or her spouse
or common-law partner or child or will damage his or her property”.
If the requirement for reasonable grounds is met, the individual in
question may be required to enter into a “peace bond” for a period of
up to twelve months prohibiting them from coming within a certain
distance of a place or communicating with the person for whom the
information was laid; see s 810(3) and (3.2). The past actions of the
defendant can be used to help determine if the informant’s fear rests
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reasonable to expect that courts are likely to assess similar
factors when considering termination or variation of insurance
policies as they do in making protection/restraining orders in
the family context. A court may make a protection order under
the BC Family Law Act when it determines that a person is an
"at-risk family member" because she or he has been subjected
to family violence or because such violence is likely to occur.
An "at-risk family member" is defined as “a person whose
safety and security is or is likely at risk from family violence
carried out by a family member”.36 Similarly, courts in Alberta
may issue protection orders if an applicant or a person on
whose behalf the order is sought has been a victim of family
violence,37 which includes “any act or threatened act that
intimidates a family member by creating a reasonable fear of
property damage or injury to a family member”.38 Relevant
factors for determining whether a court should issue a
protection order under the BC Family Law Act include history,
frequency and recentness of psychological, emotional or
physical violence. Courts will also consider whether there has
been deliberate damage to property, the current status of the
relationship between the parties including recent separations or
intent to separate, and the claimant’s perception of risks to her
or his safety and security.39 In Dawson v Dawson,40 the
claimant sought a protection order after her ex-husband served
a prison sentence for what was “described as a serious,
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on reasonable grounds; see R v Patrick (1990), 75 CR (3d) 222 (BC
Co Ct).
36

BC Family Law Act, supra note 34, s 182.

37

Alberta Protection Against Family Violence Act, supra note 34, ss 4,
6.

38

Ibid, s 1(1)(e)(ii).

39

BC Family law Act, supra note 34, s 184(1). See Morgadinho v
Morgadinho, 2014 BCSC 192 [Morgadinho].

40

2014 BCSC 44, aff’d: 2014 BCCA 44 [Dawson].
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unprovoked, and disturbing incident...a brutal attack on a
defenceless victim”, that resulted in serious bodily injuries.41 In
holding that the claimant was an at-risk family member,
justifying a protection order, Barrow J noted that while
evidence of repetitive acts of violence would often indicate the
likelihood of family violence recurring in the future, warranting
a protection order, the justification for such an order could
equally be founded on a single serious act of family violence,
as was in this case.
The passage of time may reduce the probative value of
previous acts of violence, especially in relation to a single act
of violence. However, if the circumstances that gave rise to the
earlier act(s) of violence remain unresolved, then the court is
more likely to be wary of family violence recurring in the
future.42 In addition, the nature and gravity of harm that might
ensue from an act of violence is relevant in determining
whether the claimant is at risk of future violence. The court in
Dawson preferred to adopt a preventative approach to the
determination of whether family violence was likely to recur in
the future. Barrow J stated:
Given the protective purpose of orders under
Part 9 of the Family Law Act, it is reasonable in
my view to apply what might be termed a sliding
41
42
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Dawson, ibid at para 9.
Ibid, at para 44. The court concluded that the assault on the plaintiff
was due in part to the defendant’s mental illness, which remained
unresolved: ibid, at para 44. Similarly, in Morgadinho, supra note 39,
where the parties had separated by the time of the action, the court
refused to characterize the previous acts of violence as escalating or
repetitive, and there was no likelihood of increase in the risk to the
claimant. Yet, the court concluded that the continuing dysfunctional
nature of the relationship between the parties was likely to provoke
threats of violence against the claimant, endangering her safety and
security, which justified making a protection order.
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scale to the threshold. The potential for very
serious acts of violence is sufficient to engage
the provisions of the Act, even if those acts of
violence are, in absolute terms, not particularly
likely.43
Prior abusive behaviour will not always justify making
a protection order, especially where parties have had limited
contact since separation and where that situation is unlikely to
change in the future, or where the court is confident that the
defendant is unlikely to engage in future acts of violence,
thereby making the recurrence of violence against the applicant
unlikely.44 As well, acts or threats of violence arising from
feelings of anger, animosity, betrayal, etc., during and
immediately following a relationship breakdown may diminish
over time, and thereby obviate the potential for violence
justifying a court making a protection order.45 While such a
position is intended to prevent the making of unnecessary
protection orders, courts should not lose sight of the remedial
purpose of the provision and should be cautious about refusing
to grant protection orders when the underlying trigger for
previous abusive conduct remains at large, even if future
contact between the parties is likely to be limited.
Similarly, an applicant’s subjective fear for her or his
safety will not justify making a protection order unless those
fears are objectively reasonable to justify such a limitation on
the respondent. The requirement of objective justification of an
applicant’s fear for her or his safety is intended to balance the
parties’ competing interests and prevent abuse of the court’s
powers by applicants who may have ulterior motives for
43
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Dawson, supra note 40 at para 45.
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See Cabezas v Maxim, 2014 BCSC 767; NCR v KDC, 2014 BCPC 9
at paras 117-118.

45

See Andres v Andres, 2009 ABQB 26 at para 42 [Andres].
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seeking such an order.46 However, courts need to be attentive to
the complicated and subtle ways in which victimization may
occur and the reasons why a person may reasonably feel her or
his life or health may be endangered even without seemingly
corroborative evidence. This is particularly important in
situations where there have been threats of violence that may
be escalating but not yet resulted in physical acts of violence.
In Fuda v Fuda,47 the court cautioned against the tendency to
discount an applicant’s subjective fears for her safety arising
from potential acts of violence, noting that the focus should
rather be on whether those fears are legitimate. Specifically, the
court noted that an application for a protection order should not
be denied even where the applicant’s fear for her or his safety
is somewhat subjective provided there are compelling facts
justifying those fears.48
Although there are similarities in the purposes of the
termination or variation provisions under the insurance
legislation and protection orders in the family law context, and
courts are likely to assess similar factors in determining the
appropriateness of a remedy under both regimes, the threshold
for a remedy need not be the same. Obtaining a variation or
termination remedy in the insurance context should not depend
on whether a person can establish the basis for a threat on a
balance of probabilities, but instead, whether there is a
reasonable chance of the risk materializing. Courts need to be
attentive to the insured person’s subjective assessment that her
or his life may be endangered because of the existence of a life
insurance contract on her or his life and/or the insurance
amount. However, there must be some reasonable basis for the
46
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See Andres, ibid, at para 40; RP v RP, 2012 ABQB 353 at paras 2933.
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Fuda v Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154.

48

Ibid at paras 31-32. See also Khara v McManus, 2007 ONCJ 223
[Khara].
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insured person’s concerns about their life and safety, for
instance, based on the respondent’s conduct. Care must be
taken not to insist on a high threshold that may make it difficult
for applicants to justify the need for a remedy in particular
circumstances. Dunn J’s statement in Khara in relation to an
application for a restraining order is equally instructive in this
regard; he stated that while the applicant’s perception of fear of
harassment need not “be understood by everyone…an
applicant’s fear of harassment must not be entirely subjective,
comprehended only by the applicant”.49 While past threats or
acts of violence and abuse should generally support an
application for a remedy, a court should be equally open to
granting an appropriate order even if there is no history of
abuse, provided that the evidence suggests a possibility of
violence given the parties’ current situation.
CONCLUSION
The current insurance regimes in BC, Alberta, and Manitoba,
have taken critical steps in recognizing the need for greater
protection for those whose lives are insured by others. Ontario
is moving in a similar direction with an amendment to its
insurance act that is yet to come into force. By allowing
persons whose lives are insured to apply to the court for
termination or variation of an insurance policy, more lives may
be protected. As well, more transparency and discussion on
how to better address these situations may be encouraged. This
is particularly positive for women and children who are
predominantly the victims of domestic violence. It is hoped
that other jurisdictions will also seriously consider similar
amendments to their insurance legislation. While concerns
may remain about the consequences of imposing a burden of
proof on persons whose lives are insured by others to
adequately articulate threats to their life or health, one might
argue that it is good public policy. It may be a way to balance
49
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Khara, ibid at para 33.
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the competing interests of the insured/beneficiary and the
person whose life is insured to better protect the public and in
particular victims or potential victims of domestic violence. !

